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The Chairman of the JCS summarizes the current situation in VN, methods of VC operations, routes of infiltration and supply, relative strengths, and discusses U.S. military units in place or enroute to VN. "The objectives of the Diem Government in SVN include not only survival against the communists, but also improvement of the national economy, enhancement of SVN's position among Southeast Asian nations, creations of an effective armed force, and preservation of a pro-Western orientation. "Policies directed toward the achievement of these objectives suffer from the concentration of power in the hands of the President, Ngo Dinh Diem, and a small clique headed by his extremely influential and powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu." Chairman JCS Talking Paper for Briefing President Kennedy, 9 January 1962.....

The JCS agree that the basic issue of Diem's apprehension about a coup needs to be resolved. "I don't believe there is any finite answer to the question you pose as to how to convince Diem he must delegate authority to subordinates he doesn't fully trust." JCS Memorandum for General Lansdale, CM-491-62, 18 January 1962.....

The President establishes a Special Group (Counter Insurgency), the functions of which are as follows: (1) to insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare; (2) to insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. armed forces and other U.S. agencies; (3) to continually review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with insurgency; and (4) to insure the development of adequate programs aimed at preventing or defeating insurgency. NSAM 124, 18 January 1962.....

State Department agrees that an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces to the 200,000 man level should be supported provided the following factors are considered: (1) that U.S. military advisors and the Vietnamese authorities continue to set valid tactical and strategic plans; (2) the rate of increase should consider the ability of the Army to absorb and train the additional men and the manpower resources of SVN; (3) that the armed forces should level off at 200,000 and further efforts should be devoted to

strengthening the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps; and (4) that our training programs for ARVN be based on the concept that the Vietnamese Army will start winning when it has the confidence of the Vietnamese populace. U. Alexis Johnson letter to Mr. Gilpatric, 26 January 1962.....

5. 59. Secretary McNamara forwards a JCS Memorandum to the President with the comment, "I am not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had more experience with our present program in SVN." The JCS Memorandum recommends that if, with Diem's full cooperation and the effective employment of SVN armed forces, the VC is not brought under control, then a decision should be made to deploy suitable U.S. military combat forces to SVN sufficient to achieve desired objectives. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 27 January 1962 (JCSM-33-62, 13 January 1962, attached).....

6. 60. The President requests that AID review carefully its role in the support of local police forces for internal security and counter-insurgency purposes, and recommend to him through the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) what new or renewed emphases are desirable. NSAM 132, 19 February 1962.....

7. 61. The President approves training objectives for personnel who may have a role to play in counter insurgency programs as well as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of developing countries. The training objectives include the study of: the historical background of counter insurgency, departmental tactics and techniques to counter subversive insurgency, instruction in counter insurgency program planning, specialized preparations for service in underdeveloped areas. Training of foreign nationals will also be included in the program. The President desires that current counter insurgency training be examined to ascertain if it meets the above training objectives. NSAM 131, 13 March 1962.....

8. 62. The President forwards a memorandum on the subject of VN from Ambassador Galbraith and requests Department of Defense comments. The Galbraith Memorandum (4 April 62) asserts that the U.S. is backing a weak and ineffectual government in SVN and that "there is a consequent danger that we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did." Galbraith urges that U.S. policy keep open the door for political solution, attempt to involve other countries and world opinion in a settlement, and reduce our commitment to the present leadership of GVN. In

addition to recommended specific actions, Galbraith suggests the U.S. should resist all steps to commit American troops to combat action and dissociate itself from programs which are directed at the villagers, such as the resettlement programs. White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 7 April 1962 (Galbraith Memorandum attached)...

9. 63. The JCS comment on Ambassador Galbraith's Memorandum to President Kennedy. The JCS cite the Kennedy letter of 14 December 1961 to President Diem as a public affirmation of the intention of the U.S. Government to support President Diem to whatever extent necessary to eliminate the VC threat. In sum, it is the JCS opinion that the present U.S. policy toward SVN as announced by the President "be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion." JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM 282-62, 13 April 1962.....

10. 64. ISA discusses the circumstances surrounding the Defense reply to Galbraith's Memorandum and notes the absence of formal staffing by the State Department. In a penciled note "Secretary of Defense has talked to Ambassador Galbraith and feels no reply needed. Mr. Forrestal informed this date that none would be sent." ISA Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 14 April 1962.....

10. 65. The President requests contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease-fire in Laos for action in two major areas: (1) the holding by Thai forces with U.S. back-up of that portion of northern Laos west of the Mekong River; and (2) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier with Thai, Vietnamese or U.S. forces. Kennedy indicates that he contemplates keeping U.S. forces in Thailand during the period of the negotiations by the three Princes and the early days of the government of national union. NSAM 157, 29 May 1962.....

11. 66. In an evaluation of the first three months of systematic counter-insurgency, Hilsman of State's INR reports some progress and reason for modest optimism although acknowledging the great amount yet to be done. State Department INR Research Memorandum RFE-27, 18 June 1962.....

12. 67. The President approves assignments of responsibilities in the development of U.S. and indigenous police, paramilitary, and military resources to various agencies as recommended by the Special Group on Counter Insurgency. Deficiencies revealed in the study pursuant to NSAM 56 include: country

internal defense plans, improvement of personnel programs of agencies concerned with unconventional warfare, orientation of personnel, deployment of counter insurgency personnel, support of covert paramilitary operations, increased use of third-country personnel, exploitation of minorities, improvement of indigenous intelligence organizations, and research and development for counter insurgency. NSAM 162, 19 June 1962.....

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13* Memorandum from CIA to Secretary of Defense assessing strategic hamlet program, [July 13] 1962

68. 14. The President approves a national counter insurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by subversive insurgency. NSAM 182, 24 August 1962.....

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4. 15. In a year-end summary of the Vietnamese situation and prognosis, Hilsman (State INR) concludes that at best the rate of deterioration has been decreased. GVN control of the countryside, the Strategic Hamlet Program notwithstanding, has increased only slightly. State Department INR Research Memorandum RFE-59, 3 December 1962.....

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* 16. Memo for the President from Michael V. Forrestal evaluating situation in Vietnam, February, 1963

17. A National Intelligence Estimate states that "Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly U.S. involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt." The VC will continue to wage a war of attrition and there is no threat of overt attack from the North. On the basis of the last year's progress the VC can be contained but it is impossible "to project the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight." NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," 17 April 1963.....

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18. The President approves and directs certain actions outlined in the Department of State Memorandum of 17 June 1963, relative to Laos planning. The President wishes to obtain suggestions for actions in Laos in light of the deteriorating situation and from the British and the French before initiating any action under the Memorandum. Kennedy asks about additional U.S. actions to be taken in Laos before any action directed against NVN. NSAM 249, 25 June 1963...

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19. The President is briefed on developments in Indonesia, Laos and VN. Specifically, on SVN, discussions cover the possibility

political actions, possible results of a coup, and the replacement of Ambassador Nolting with Ambassador Lodge. Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 4 July 1963.....

- 20.* Memorandum of conversation, Ball, Nolting, Wood and Springstein, *on current situation,*
July 5 1963

21. A Special National Intelligence Estimate evaluates the political crisis in South Vietnam arising from the Buddhist protest. It concludes that if Diem does not seek to conciliate the Buddhists new disorders are likely and there will be better than even chances of coup or assassination attempts. U.S.-GVN relations have deteriorated as a function of Diem's distrust of U.S. motives in the Buddhist affair and he may seek to reduce the U.S. presence in Vietnam. The Communists have thus far not exploited the Buddhist crisis and they would not necessarily profit from a non-Communist overthrow. A successor regime with continued U.S. support would have good chances of effectively pursuing the war. SNIE 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam," 10 July 1963.....

22. In a subsequently controversial cable, State informs Lodge that if Diem is unwilling or unable to remove Nhu from the government, that the U.S. will have to prepare for alternatives. Lodge is authorized to inform the Vietnamese generals plotting a coup that if Nhu is not removed we will be prepared to discontinue economic and military aid, to accept a change of government and to offer support in any period of interim breakdown of the central government mechanism. State Department Message to Saigon 243, State to Lodge, 24 August 1963.....

23.* Lodge's reply to Washington re: Diem, August 25 1963

24.* CIA cable to ~~Chief~~ on Contacts with Saigon Generals, August 26 1963

25.* CIA ~~Station Chiefs~~ cable on coup prospects in Saigon, August 28 1963

26. U.S. policy with respect to a coup is defined in more detail for Lodge and Harkins as a result of an NSC meeting with the President. "The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces. Harkins should state (to the generals) that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans, but will not engage directly in joint coup planning." Lodge is authorized to suspend aid if he thinks it will enhance the chances of a successful coup. State Department Message 272, State to Lodge and Harkins, 29 August 1963.....

27. Rusk raises with Lodge the possibility of a last approach to Diem about removing Nhu before going ahead with the coup. He notes that General Harkins favors such an attempt. Rusk

i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. support -- such an approach could be timed to coincide with the readiness of the generals to make their move and might, therefore, offer some promise of getting Diem to act. State Department Message 279, State to Lodge, 29 August 1963.....

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28. Lodge cable to State Department, re: U.S. policy toward a coup, August 29, 1963
29. Lodge response to State on Diem's closeness to brother, August 30, 1963
30. Cable, by ~~U.S. General in Saigon~~ ^{MAAG Chief} to ~~Taylor~~ ^{JCS} on ~~end of August plot~~ ^{halt in coup planning}, August 31, 1963

Vice President Johnson presides over a meeting at the State Department on the subject of SVN. The generals' plot having aborted, Rusk asks what in the situation "lead us to think well of a coup." Further, Rusk feels that it is unrealistic now "to start off by saying that Nhu has to go." McNamara approves Rusk's remarks. Hilsman presents four basic factors bearing on the current situation: (1) the restive mood of the South Vietnamese population; (2) the effect on U.S. programs elsewhere in Asia of the current GVN policy against the Buddhists; (3) the personality and policies of Nhu; and (4) U.S. and world opinion. Vice President has great reservations about a coup because he sees no genuine alternative to Diem. General Krulak Memorandum for the Record, 31 August 1963.....

Lodge is instructed by the White House that since there is no longer any prospect of a coup, pressure must be applied to Diem to get him to adopt an extensive list of reforms. In particular Lodge is authorized to hold up any aid program if he thinks such action will give him useful leverage in dealing with Diem. CAP Message 63516, White House to Lodge, 17 September 1963.....

The President explains to Lodge his urgent need for the McNamara-Taylor assessment of the situation... The visit is not designed to be a reconciliation with Diem, rather he expects McNamara will speak frankly to him about the military consequences of the political crisis. State Department Message 431, The President to Lodge, 18 September 1963.....

Lodge's reply to the White House CAP Message 63516 indicates agreement that a coup is no longer in the offing, but opposes both an approach to Diem on reforms or the use of an aid suspension as a lever. He regards both as likely to be unproductive or worse. Embassy Saigon Message 544, Lodge to State for President Only, 19 September 1963.....

President Kennedy outlines his reasons for sending McNamara and Taylor to VN: "I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of

the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the VC." While the results from programs developed after Taylor's Mission in 1961 were heartening, the serious events in the South since May 1963 have prompted the President to ask McNamara to make a fresh, first-hand appraisal of the situation. "In my judgement the question of the progress of the contest in SVN is of the first importance..." President Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 September 1963..... 552 ✓

36 82. Pending McNamara's visit and the subsequent review of policy, Lodge is given the following interim guidance: "(1) The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Cong. (2) Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there can be important improvements in the government of South Vietnam. (3) It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improvement." State Department Message 458, Eyes Only for Lodge from Ball, 22 September 1963..... 553 ✓

37.* Memorandum of conversation (Diem, Thuan, Lodge, McNamara, Taylor, Harkins, Flott) September 29, 1963

38. The McNamara-Taylor Mission Report concludes that the military campaign has made great progress, and, while the political crisis in Saigon is serious, "there is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup..." The Report recommends against promoting a coup and, although it is not clear that U.S. pressure will move Diem to the moderations and reforms we desire, nevertheless, as the only course of action with any prospect of producing results, the report recommends the application of selective economic sanctions, including a suspension of funds for the commodity import program. The Mission further recommends a shift of military emphasis to the Delta and a consolidation of the Strategic Hamlet Program. In addition, it is recommended that a training program be established for RVNAF such that the bulk of U.S. personnel may be withdrawn by the end of 1965. In conjunction with this program, the U.S. should announce plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.. 554 ✓

39. Lodge is advised that as a result of the policy review just completed, the "President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup." Efforts to build and maintain contacts with "alternative leadership" is authorized, however. CAP Message 63560, to Lodge via CAS channel, 5 October 1963..... 574 ✓

40. Contact has been renewed by the generals with a CAS agent who has been apprised of the reactivation of plotting. In the

meeting, General Minh states that he must know the U.S. position on a coup. He stresses that a coup is urgently needed to prevent the loss of the war to the VC. The U.S. contact is noncommittal. CAS Saigon Message 1445, Lodge to State, 5 October 1963.....

41. 88. Washington reaffirms Lodge's guidance that he is not to promote a coup. Neither, however, is he to thwart one. He should try to obtain as much information as possible from the plotters about their plans on which to base an American judgement about their likelihood of success. CIA Message 74228, 6 October 1963.....

42. 89. The President approves the detailed military recommendations contained in the McNamara-Taylor Report, but directs that no announcement of the implementation of the 1,000-man withdrawal plan be made. NSAM 263, 11 October 1963.....

43. 88. A Department of State Research Memorandum contends that the statistical indicators on the war in Vietnam reveal "that the military position of the Vietnam Government may have reverted to the point it had reached six months to a year ago." The analysis angers the JCS and Rusk subsequently apologizes to McNamara. Department of State, INR Research Memorandum RFE-90, 22 October 1963.....

44. 89. With the coup plotting now far advanced and the U.S. clearly committed to the generals' attempt, Lodge seeks to calm Washington's anxieties about the lack of detailed information on the generals' plans. He is at pains to oppose any thought of thwarting the coup because he thinks the military will create a government with better potential for carrying on the war, and because it would constitute undue meddling in Vietnamese affairs. Embassy Saigon Message 1964, Lodge to McGeorge Bundy, 25 October 1963.....

45. 88. While thanking Lodge for his views, the White House indicates that short of thwarting a coup we should retain the prerogative of reviewing the plans and discouraging any attempt with poor prospects of success. CAP Message 63590, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 25 October 1963.....

46. 88. The White House instructs Lodge to bring General Harkins completely up to date on the coup plotting, and asks that Harkins, Lodge and the CIA Station Chief provide a combined assessment of the prospects of the plotters. Individual comments are to be sent if desired. With these assessments, a decision can be made telling the generals:

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(a) we will maintain a hands-off policy, (b) we will positively encourage the coup, or (c) we will discourage it. More detailed military plans should be sought from Minh. CAS Message 79109, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 30 October 1963.....

47, 92. After complaining about Lodge's failure to keep him informed about the coup planning, General Harkins opposes the proposed coup against Diem. He does not see an alternative leadership with Diem's strength of character, especially not among the generals. The war continues to go well. MACV Message 2028, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October 1963.....

48, 93. General Harkins takes detailed exception to the interpretations of a deteriorating war effort that Lodge has been transmitting throughout October. He offers an optimistic appraisal of the trend of the war and sees the political crisis as having only a marginal effect on troop morale and military effectiveness. MACV Message 2033, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October 1963.....

49. Bundy cable to Lodge voicing White House concern on coup, October 30, 1963

50, 94. Lodge argues forcefully for the coup. "It is theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop the coup and would make traitors out of us. For practical purposes, therefore, I would say that we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair." In the event the coup fails, he believes we should do what we can to help evacuate the generals' dependents. Lodge believes the generals are all taking enormous risks for the sake of their country and their good faith is not to be questioned. "Heartily agree that a miscalculation could jeopardize position in Southeast Asia. We also run tremendous risks by doing nothing." General Harkins did not concur in the cable. CAS Saigon Message 2063, 30 October 1963.....

51, 95. Taking note of the difference of opinion on the advisability of a coup between Lodge and Harkins, the White House specifically informs Lodge that he is to discourage the generals from any attempt that in his judgement has a poor prospect of success. Lodge is given full authority for country team actions in the event of a coup; if he has left for Washington, Harkins will have charge. In the event of a coup, U.S. policy will be: (a) to reject appeals for direct intervention from either side; (b) if the contest is indecisive, U.S. authorities may perform any actions agreed

to by both sides; (c) in the event the coup fails, asylum may be offered to anyone to whom we have an obligation; but (d) once the coup has started, it is in our interests to see that it succeeds. CAS Washington Message 79407, 30 October 1963.....

52. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense on the Vietnam situation, 21 December, 1963.
53. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 22 January 1964⁺.
54. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense on the present situation in South Vietnam, March 16, 1964.
55. Cable from JCS to CINCPAC re planning actions against North Vietnam, March 18, 1964.
56. Cable from the President for Ambassador Lodge, March 20, 1964.
57. Summary of JSCM-426-64, "North Vietnam Operations", May 19, 1964 (author unknown).
58. Cable, Saigon 214 to State Department on GVN reaction to "Marching North", July 25, 1964.
59. Cable, State 89 to Vientiane requesting views on crossborder operations into Laos, July 26, 1964.
60. Cable, Vientiane 170 to State on reactions to crossborder operations, July 27, 1964.
61. Cable, probably JCS to CINCPAC, on rules of engagement currently in effect, August 5, 1964.
62. Cable, State 136 to Vientiane on actions in Laos, August 7, 1964.
63. Draft cable for Embassy Ottawa on points for Seaborn to make in Hanoi, August 7, 1964.
64. Final message re points Seaborn should be urged to make, given to Shenstone, Canadian Embassy by Green, August 8, 1964.
65. Cable, CINCPAC 176 from Saigon on reactions to Tonkin, August 9, 1964.
- ~~66. Cable, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC re crossborder operations, August 1964.~~
66. Joint State/Defense cable to Saigon, Vientiane and Bangkok re. air and ground operations in Laos, August 9, 1964.
67. Memorandum by William Bundy titled Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia, August 11, 1964.
68. Letter from McNaughton to William Bundy re rules of engagement, August 11, 1964.
- ~~69. Draft Rules of Engagement, ASD/ISA, 11 August 1964.~~
69. Memorandum for Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense from JCS Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, re Ambassador Taylor's report from South Vietnam, 14 August 1964.
70. Taylor Situation Report on the RVN, presented 10 August 1964.
71. Cable from State to Saigon, Vientiane, CINCPAC, giving key points in tentative high level paper, 14 August 1964.

72. Cable, JCS 7947 to CINCPAC, on ^{lc} Rules of Engagement, 15 August 1964.
73. Cable, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC re ^{lc} 510 planning on crossborder operations, 16 August 1964.
74. Cable, Vientiane 310 to State re Laos air strikes, 17 August 1964.
75. Cable, CINCPAC 17 to JCS re next courses of action in Southeast Asia, 17 August 1964.
76. Extract from JCS memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Combat Air Capability in North Vietnam", 17 August 1964.
77. Cable, Saigon 465 to State, on the problem in South Vietnam, 18 August 1964.
78. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) re Review of USAF study: "Relationship of Tactical Air to Ground Forces, Southeast Asia, 1964 and 1969", August 24, 1964.
79. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from JCS re recommended courses of action in Southeast Asia, August 26, 1964.
80. State Department cable on SAR and T-28 missions (addressee unknown), August 26, 1964.
81. Memorandum for William Bundy and J.T. McNaughton, ^{from JCS/SACSA} re September schedule for OPLAN 34A, 27 August 1964.
82. Memorandum for the Sec. of Defense from John T. McNaughton, re response to JCS target study of North Vietnam, August 29, 1964.
83. Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from Robert McNamara, on JCS target study of North Vietnam, 31 August 1964.
84. Paper by McNaughton (2nd draft) Plan of Action for South Vietnam, 3 September 1964.
85. Memorandum to Robert Manning from McGeorge Bundy on possible problems in current form of Q&A booklet on Vietnam, 4 September 1964.
86. Draft paper by Wm. Bundy Courses of Action for South Vietnam, 8 September 1964.
87. Memorandum recording Principals' consensus on courses of action for South Vietnam, 8 September 1964.
88. State/Defense message to Saigon, Vietiane, Bangkok re Laos corridor operations, 9 September 1964.

~~7c.89: Rules of engagement, Desoto Patrol (source illegible)~~

89.80: Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the JCS on 8 September Bundy draft, 9 September 1964.

90. Rules of engagement, Desoto Patrol, recommended by JCS, 9 September 1964.

91. NSAM 314, 10 September 1964.
92. Cable, Saigon 913 to State, summary of conclusions of meeting of three embassies held in Saigon on 11 September to review air and ground operations in the Lao corridor, 19 September 1964.
93. Cable, CINCPAC to JCS re Desote Patrols, 21 September 1964.
94. Cable, CINCPAC to JCS re planning for future contingencies, 25 September 1964.
95. Cable, JCS 9117 to CINCPAC re rules of engagement applying to Laos, 28 September 1964.
96. Memorandum to McNaughton from Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance re 34A MAROPS procedures, 30 September 1964.
97. Questions and answers on covert actions. Questions by J.T. McNaughton, answers by JCS and ISA, September 1964.
98. Cable, CINCPAC to JCS on use of Thai-based US air forces, 2 October 1964.
99. Cable, Saigon to State on SEACoord, 3 October 1964.
100. State/Defense message to Vientiane authorizing commencement of air attacks against infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos Panhandle, 6 October 1964.
101. Cable, State to Saigon re convening organizing session for SEACoord, 7 October 1964.
102. Deptel 763 from Saigon on organizing session for SEACoord, 9 October 1964.
103. Cable, Saigon 1080 to State transmitting approved terms of reference for SEACoord, 10 October 1964.
104. Memorandum to J.A. Califano (author unknown) re views of Lao Deputy Prime Minister on expanded military operations in Northern Laos, 3-7 October 1964.
105. Paper by McNaughton (1st draft) Aims and Actions in Southeast Asia, 13 October 1964.
107. Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from McNaughton re US search and rescue operations in Southeast Asia, 23 October 1964.
106. Cable, Saigon 1129 to State re situation in South Vietnam, 14 October 1964.
108. State/Defense message to Saigon and Vientiane re recommendations for expansion of SAR operations into Laos, 29 October 1964.
109. State/Defense message for Saigon, exclusive for Taylor, re expanded operations, 29 October 1964.

110. State/Defense 937 to Saigon re legitimization of OP 34A, 29 October 1964.
111. Cable, JCS to Sharp, Westmoreland, Taylor on reactions to Bien Hoa attack, 1 November 1964.
112. Project outline for working group on Courses of Action in Southeast Asia, 3 November 1964.
113. Cable, Saigon to Washington, comments on plans for action against North Vietnam, 3 November 1964.
114. Memorandum for Wm. Bundy from Michael Forrestal commenting on paper, U.S. Objectives and Stakes in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 4 November 1964.
115. Paper by Wm. Bundy, Condition for Action and Key Actions surrounding any Decision, 5 November 1964.
116. Memorandum for Wm. Bundy from Wm. H. Sullivan re courses of action in Vietnam, 6 November 1964.
117. Working group draft, Probable Reactions to Options B and C, 6 November 1964.
118. Paper by McNaughton (2nd draft) for Bundy Working Group, Action for South Vietnam, 6 November 1964.
119. Paper by McNaughton (3rd draft) for Bundy Working Group, Action for South Vietnam, 7 November 1964.
120. Draft paper by Wm. Bundy III, The Broad Options, 7 November 1964.
121. Paper by Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Immediate Actions in the Period Prior to Decision (Part VIII of Working Group Outline), 7 November 1964.
122. Draft paper by Wm. Bundy, VII. Analysis of Option C ("progressive application of military pressure"), 8 November 1964.
123. JCS Staff comments on NSC Working Group paper, Section I-The Situation, 19 November 1964.
124. Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Working Group on Southeast Asia, from L.M. Mustin, JCS Staff, re comments on draft for Part II U.S. Objectives and Stakes in SVN and SEA, 10 November 1964.
125. EMBTEL 1438, Saigon to State, on U. Alexis Johnson talk with Seaborn, 14 November 1964.
126. JCS Memorandum 955-64 on actions against North Vietnam, 14 November 1964 (first section missing).

127. Memorandum for Wm. Bundy, Chairman of NSC Working Group on Southeast Asia, from L.M. Mustin, JCS Staff, providing additional material for project on Courses of Action in Southeast Asia, 14 November 1964.
128. Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from Walt Rostow re military dispositions and political signals, 16 November 1964.
129. Part VI (Analysis of Option B), Section F--Likely Developments and Problems if the Communist Side Engaged in Major Retaliation at Some Point, unsigned, undated.
130. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from JCS re courses of action in Southeast Asia, 18 November 1964.
131. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense re JCS position on resumption of Desoto Patrols, 18 November 1964.
132. Memorandum from Henry Rowen to William Bundy enclosing Rowen and McNaughton comments on draft paper, 23 November 1964.
133. Memorandum to Wm. Bundy from Michael Forrestal commenting on draft paper Section II--U.S. Objectives and Stakes in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 23 November 1964.
134. Memorandum to Secretary of State from Walt Rostow, Some Observations as We Come to the Crunch in Southeast Asia, 23 November 1964.
135. Memorandum for Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy on issues raised by papers on Southeast Asia, from Wm. Bundy, 24 November 1964.
136. NSC Working Group paper, Section I--Intelligence Assessment: The Situation in Vietnam, 24 November 1964.
137. Revised paper by Wm. Bundy and McNaughton, Summary: Courses of Action in Southeast Asia, 26 November 1964.
138. Taylor briefing on the current situation in South Vietnam, 27 November 1964.
139. Paper titled Summary of Recent MACV and CIA Cables on Infiltration, author unknown, 27 November 1964.
140. Memorandum of meeting on Southeast Asia, distributed by Wm. Bundy to those present at meeting: Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, McCone, Wheeler, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, McNaughton, Forrestal, 27 November 1964.
141. Memorandum for Southeast Asia Principals from Wm. Bundy, Scenario for Immediate Action Program, 28 November 1964.
142. Memorandum for Southeast Asia Principals from Wm. Bundy attaching draft action paper for review at meeting, 29 November 1964.
143. McNaughton observations re South Vietnam, 4 January 1965.

144. Memorandum for the Secretary of State from Wm. Bundy on the South Vietnamese situation and alternatives, 6 January 1965.

145. McNaughton observations re South Vietnam after Khanh's "re-coup", with McNamara comments, 27 January 1965.

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2. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from Wm. Bundy, Additional Military and Diplomatic Possibilities, 10 February 1965.
3. Draft paper by Wm. Bundy, Where Are We Heading?, 18 February 1965.
4. Memorandum for Robert S. McNamara from McNaughton, Proposed Course of Action re Vietnam (draft), 24 March 1965.
5. NSAM 328, 6 April 1965.
6. Cable, Taylor to Rusk re-step-up in ground forces, 17 April 1965.
7. McNamara report of meeting in Honolulu with Wm. Bundy, McNaughton, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp, and Westmoreland, 21 April 1965.
8. Cable, Westmoreland to CINCPAC on concept of operations, force requirements and deployments, 13 June 1965.
- ~~98~~. Memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, both Bundys, McNaughton and Unger from George Ball, Part II, 29 June 1965.
- ~~108~~. Memorandum from Wm. Bundy, Holding On in South Vietnam, 30 June 1965.
- ~~1110~~. Memorandum for the President from George Ball, A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam, 1 July 1965.
- ~~1211~~. Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam, 20 July 1965.
- ~~1312~~. Report by McNamara after visit to Vietnam, 30 November 1965.
- ~~1418~~. Paper, Military and Political Actions Recommended for SVN, probably written by McNamara, 7 December 1965.

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- ~~1514~~. Memorandum to the President re statistics for the military situation in Vietnam, probably prepared by McNamara, 22 January 1966.
- ~~1613~~. Short note re program to increase the effectiveness of military operations and anticipated results, probably written by McNamara, 8 February 1966.
- ~~1718~~. Draft paper, Actions Recommended for Vietnam, probably written by McNamara, 14 October 1966.
- ~~1817~~. Draft memorandum from McNamara on recommended FY67 SEA Supplemental Appropriation recommending 469,000 U.S. troops to SVN by June 30, 1968, 17 November 1966.